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SOME OBJECTIONS TO STRICT LIABILITY
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Michael L. Wells*
Qualified immunity protects officials from damages for
constitutional violations unless they have violated "clearly
established" rights. Local governments enjoy no immunity, but
they may not be sued on a vicarious liability theory for
constitutional violations committed by their employees. Critics
of the current regime would overturn these rules in order to
vindicate constitutional rights and deter violations. This
Article argues that across-the-board abolition of these limits on
liability would be unwise as the costs would outweigh the
benefits. In some contexts, however, exceptions may be justified.
Much of the recent controversy surrounding qualified
immunity involves suits in which police officers are sued for
excessive force. The case for qualified immunity is weak in that
context. But, in other contexts, the case for qualified immunity
is much stronger, making calls for its complete abolition
unwise.

*Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. B.A. 1972, J.D., 1975, University of Virginia.
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I. INTRODUCTION

When officers and local governments violate constitutional
rights, their victims may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 in order to
vindicate their rights and deter future violations. 2 But § 1983
litigation does not fully vindicate rights and deter rights violations
because many hurdles stand in the way of recovery-even when the
plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation. 3 This Article is

1 The statute provides that "[e]very person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any [constitutional rights]
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
2 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) ("Section 1983 creates a species of
liability in favor of persons deprived of their federal civil rights by those wielding state
authority."); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (discussing how "liability
encourages [government] officials to carry out their duties in a lawful and appropriate
manner" and compensates victims when deterrence fails); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-10 (1986) (describing the purpose of § 1983 damages as
compensation and deterrence); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("In situations
of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees."); Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980) (explaining
"[t]he central aim of the Civil Rights Act" and noting that "[a] damages remedy against the
offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional
guarantees"); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) ("The policies underlying
§ 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and
prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law."); cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856-57 (2017) (noting that similar purposes are served by the "implied"
cause of action against federal officials for constitutional violations). The "implied" cause of
action doctrine, first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown FederalNarcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), differs from § 1983 litigation because it exists "absent statutory authorization."
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1854. Over the past several decades, the Court has steadily limited its
scope, largely due to separation of powers concerns. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735,
739 (2020) (stating that "the Constitution's separation of powers requires [the Court] to
exercise caution before extending Bivens"); Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1848 ("The question is
whether Congress or the courts should decide to authorize a damages suit. Most often it will
be Congress ... " (citation omitted)). To the extent the Bivens doctrine remains viable despite
those concerns, the qualified immunity doctrine applies, and the analysis in this Article is
relevant to its scope.
3 For example, a state government cannot be sued under § 1983, no matter how egregious
its acts. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[N]either a State nor
its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983."). Likewise, absolute
immunity precludes suits for damages against legislators, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses,
no matter how egregious their conduct. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., PAMELA S. KARLAN, PETER
W. Low & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION

49-89 (4th ed. 2018) (providing an overview of the absolute immunity doctrine).
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concerned with two especially important obstacles to the success of
§ 1983 plaintiffs: (1) qualified immunity, which protects officers
from suits for damages unless they violated clearly established law;
and (2) the rule that local governments may not be sued on a
vicarious liability theory for constitutional torts committed by their
employees. Both doctrines have drawn criticism from scholars and
commentators across the political spectrum in the aftermath of the
police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. 4 Members of Congress
have introduced bills that would abolish 5 or limit qualified
immunity. 6

4 See, e.g., The Editorial Board, How the Supreme Court Lets Cops Get Away with Murder,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/Minneapolis-policeGeorge-Floyd.html (criticizing qualified immunity for providing police officers "a get-out-ofjail-free card in far too many instances"); Clark Neily, To Make Police Accountable, End
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (May 31, 2020), https://www.cato.org/commentary/makepolice-accountable-end-qualified-immunity (arguing that qualified immunity betrays
conservatives' "stated commitment to textualism"); Orion de Nevers, A Dubious Legal
Doctrine Protects Cities from Lawsuits over Police Brutality, SLATE (June 2, 2020, 2:16 PM),
https ://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/monell-supreme-court-qualified-immunity.html
(arguing that lack of municipal liability for employees' actions "creates serious injustice").
It is worth noting that the officers involved in George Floyd's case will almost certainly not
benefit from qualified immunity. It is clearly established law that the police may not use
force-much less deadly force-against a person who is not resisting arrest, fleeing, or
threatening anyone. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that the
reasonableness of the force used depends on "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight"); Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus,
871 F.3d 998, 1018-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing several cases where the reasonableness of
force factors were analyzed); Ciolino v. Gikas, 861 F.3d 296, 303-06 (1st Cir. 2017) (same);
Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Our cases hold that gratuitous
use of force when a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force."). As
for the officers who stood by, it is clearly established in several circuit courts of appeals that
they could be sued on a "bystander liability" theory. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L.
WELLS, THOMAS A. EATON & FRED SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 243-44 (4th ed. 2015)

(describing the elements of the "bystander liability" theory); see, e.g., McManemy v. Tierney,
970 F.3d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that a "failure-to-intervene claim" attaches where
an officer does not act to stop an unconstitutional use of force by another officer).
5 For example, the House of Representatives passed the George Floyd Justice in Policing
Act of 2020 on March 4, 2021. H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (proposing to abolish
qualified immunity for suits against "local law enforcement officer"); see also Ending
Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
clarify that qualified immunity is not a defense).
s Catie Edmondson, Democrats Unveil Sweeping Bill Targeting Police Misconduct and
Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/politics/dem
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First, under the "qualified" immunity doctrine, officers "are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established .

.

. constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known." 7 According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, qualified immunity keeps a lid on the "social
costs" of this type of litigation, which include:
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from pressing public issues,

. .

. the deterrence of able

citizens from acceptance of public office[,] ... [and] the
danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their
duties."8

Second, Monell v. Department of Social Services held that a local
government is liable for constitutional torts caused by its "policy" or
"custom." 9 But Monell also held that local governments cannot be
sued on a respondeat superior theory for torts committed by their
employees in the course of their employment.10 That is, the principle
of vicarious liability, though well-established in ordinary tort law,"
does not apply to § 1983 litigation. Unless the constitutional
violation is directly committed by a policymaker, the plaintiff must
show "deliberate indifference" on the part of the government's
policymakers in order to prevail. 12 In tandem, qualified immunity
and the "no vicarious liability" doctrine make it hard for plaintiffs

ocrats-police-misconduct-bill-protests.html (describing recently proposed legislation that
seeks "to alter ... qualified immunity").
7 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
8 Id. at 814 (third alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949)); see also id. at 816-17 (discussing the "substantial costs [that] attend the litigation
of the subjective good faith of government officials").
9 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
0 Id. at 693-94.
1 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
649-66 (12th ed. 2020) (excerpting and discussing cases that show the longstanding role of
vicarious liability in ordinary tort law).
12 See Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (explaining the "deliberate indifference"
requirement in the context of a "failure to train" claim); Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (establishing that "deliberate indifference" is the correct standard
for municipal liability and that "simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice").
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to win, whether they sue an officer or the local government that
employs the officer.
The recent legislative proposals respond to a general sense that
Mr. Floyd's death highlighted the need for reform. But they are not
just spur-of-the-moment reactions. Many analysts find fault with a
regime in which the vindication of constitutional rights is sacrificed
for the sake of minimizing social costs. 13 A recent, and especially
powerful, critique focuses on qualified immunity. In a series of
articles, Professor Joanna Schwartz has dismantled the Court's
rationale for qualified immunity.14 Drawing on an impressive body
of empirical research and analysis, much of it her own, she has
shattered several of the U.S. Supreme Court's cherished myths. She
has shown (among other things) that "officers are virtually always
indemnified" by their employers, 15 that "legal liability was not
among [surveyed officers'] top ten thoughts when doing their
work," 16 and that qualified immunity does not, in practice,
significantly diminish the expenses of constitutional tort
litigation. 17 Professor Schwartz contends that the benefits of

13 See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a
Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 402-17 (2018) (surveying the academic
criticisms of qualified immunity and the lack of vicarious liability for local governments).
14 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 316
(2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity] (outlining "five predictions" of what
"constitutional litigation after qualified immunity" would look like based on her empirical
studies); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity's Selection Effects, 114 Nw. U. L. REV.
1101, 1101-02 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Qualified Immunity's Selection Effects]
(analyzing the "role qualified immunity plays in decisions to forgo" lawsuits against police
officers who violate one's civil rights); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case
Against Qualified Immunity] ("If the Court did find an appropriate case to reconsider
qualified immunity, and took seriously available evidence about qualified immunity's
historical precedents and current operation, the Court could not justify the continued
existence of the doctrine ... ").
15 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification]; see also James E. Pfander, Alexander A.
Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens
Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 579-80 (2020) (discussing an empirical study finding
that in over 95% of the cases studied, individual defendants contributed no personal resources
to the resolution of Bivens claims brought against them).
16 Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 14, at 352.
17 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 60 (2017)
(finding, based on her empirical studies, that "qualified immunity may actually increase the
costs and delays associated with Section 1983 litigation").
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qualified immunity are small, yet the doctrine frustrates the
vindication and deterrence goals of § 1983 litigation. 18 She
concludes that qualified immunity is unjustified and should be
abolished. 19
The persuasive power of Professor Schwartz's thesis may vary
depending on its target. We must distinguish between (a) the
current U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on qualified immunity, and
(b) the general principle that qualified immunity is sometimes
appropriate. The current doctrine is a comparatively easy target as

it protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." 20 Even defendants who meet those criteria may
escape liability "unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite
that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have
understood that he was violating it." 21 Professor Schwartz makes a

strong case that this approach is unnecessarily protective of official
misconduct. 22

See Schwartz, QualifiedImmunity's Selection Effects, supra note 14, at 1163-64 (arguing
that "a growing body of empirical research makes clear that qualified immunity doctrine is
not achieving its intended policy goals" and "amplifies the burdens and risks of constitutional
litigation" for civil rights plaintiffs).
19 See Schwartz, The Case Against QualifiedImmunity, supra note 14, at 1800 (stating that
the Court "should restrict or do away with the qualified immunity defense altogether"). A
quite different objection to qualified immunity is that it is "unlawful" because it is not
authorized by § 1983. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 45, 47 (2018) (concluding that the "legal rationales" for qualified immunity do not "hold
up"). Indeed, the statute makes no mention of the doctrine. In my view, the short answer to
Baude's objection is that § 1983 is properly understood as a broadly worded "common law
statute," for which the Court must and does develop a workable body of doctrine. Hillel Y.
Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation:A Response to
William Baude, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 42 (2018); see also Larry Kramer & Alan 0.
Sykes, MunicipalLiability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.
249, 256-57 & n.29 (making a similar point); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A
Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1854-75 (2018)
(discussing other grounds for rejecting Baude's view).
20 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
21 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting
Plumhoffv. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014)).
22 See Schwartz, QualifiedImmunity's Selection Effects, supra note 14, at 1109 ("[Q]ualified
immunity undermines government accountability in underappreciated ways: by discouraging
lawyers from filing cases involving novel claims, making it more difficult for lawyers to make
a living bringing civil rights cases, and causing lawyers to abandon this line of work.").
18
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Wholesale repudiation of qualified immunity raises a distinct set
of issues. Abolition would, in effect, impose a kind of strict liability
in the sense that officers-or the governments they work for-would
be liable for damages even when they have no fair warning that
their acts violate constitutional rights. In this Article, I show that
Professor Schwartz's impressive body of empirical work does not
fully support her normative conclusion that qualified immunity
must be abolished. My argument is based on two premises. First,
constitutional "rights and remedies are inextricably intertwined" 23
such that "not every constitutional-rights violation should always
elicit .

.

. an

individually

effective

remedy." 24

Availability

of

damages should turn on a variety of factors that bear on the
advantages and disadvantages of a particular remedy in a
particular context. 25 For example, there are good reasons to abolish
qualified immunity in fact patterns like Mr. Floyd's, in which the
police use excessive force. 26 The case for across-the-board abolition
of qualified immunity is weaker.
Second, in comparing the pluses and minuses of a damages
remedy, it is appropriate to draw from the conceptual apparatus of

ordinary tort law because the vindication and deterrence framework
of constitutional tort law closely resembles that of tort theory. 27 The
point here is not that ordinary tort law should be mechanically

23 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 858 (1999).
24 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to ConstitutionalTorts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933,
940 (2019). In fact, few critics of immunity seem willing to apply the logic of abolition across
the whole range of constitutional torts. Full-fledged vindication and deterrence would seem
to require abolition of absolute immunity as well as qualified immunity, yet neither Professor
Schwartz nor other critics of immunity seem to go so far as to advocate holding judges and
legislators liable for constitutional torts. They seem to accept, if only implicitly, the
proposition that there are solid grounds for some limits on recovery. Thus, the issue is not
whether to limit recovery, but how much to limit it.
25 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 482-83, 495 (2011) (explaining the "Equilibration Thesis").
26 See infra notes 227-231 and accompanying text.
27 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (proposing "a mixed theory of tort law"
that "attend[s] to both deterrence and corrective justice"); Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of
Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105, 106 (2003) (discussing the need for negligence
law to balance interests outside of those of the injurer and victim).
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applied to § 1983 cases. 28 Rather, the task is to adapt common law
principles to the constitutional tort context.2 9 Tort principles are
relevant, though not dispositive, because § 1983 "creates a species
of tort liability"30 and "should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions."3 1 As the U.S. Supreme Court recently described the
relationship between § 1983 and the common law, "[c]ommon-law
principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition
of § 1983 claims." 32
Tort theory distinguishes between two goals: vindication of
rights and deterrence of future violations. 33 With respect to
vindication, Professor Schwartz and other critics are on solid
ground. Unfettered liability would enable more effective vindication
of rights, and vindication achieves corrective justice between the
plaintiff and the defendant-a viable goal of constitutional torts. 34
With respect to deterrence, the current doctrine is likewise lacking.
But the shortcomings of the current approach do not justify the
abandonment of all constraints on liability. There are two objections
to the deterrence rationale for strict liability. First, tort theory
suggests that strict liability may not deter many more violations

Professor Fallon would "substantially jettison the ordinary, private-law tort system as
an anchor for thinking about constitutional remedies." Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note
24, at 939. One of his reasons is that some constitutional violations, such as "discriminatory
conduct directed at particular individuals and infringements of the free speech rights of
public employees," do not resemble common law torts. Id. at 974. Another concern is that we
should not "return to a common law regime in which governmental officials were subject to
the same liability rules as ordinary citizens." Id. at 939. I hope to show that, despite these
concerns, the issues raised by backward-looking suits for damages for constitutional
violations have much in common with the issues raised by ordinary tort suits and that tort
principles can be helpful in resolving those issues.
29 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978) ("[T]he interests protected by a
particular branch of the common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by
a particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules
of damages directly to the § 1983 action.").
30 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
31 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
32
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 921 (2017).
33 See supra notes 2-3, 27.
34 See Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional
Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 903 (2001) ("Following the common law model, the Supreme Court
has ... rul[ed] that the aims of liability for damages are to vindicate constitutional rights and
to deter constitutional violations.").
28
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than replacing the current doctrine with a negligence system.35
Second, no matter what the liability rule is, tort law is not welldesigned to effectively deter violations. Its deterrent impact
depends on several contingencies, including the willingness of
injured persons to sue, the damages awarded by juries, and how
tortfeasors respond to the liability.36 If the goal is to undertake a
systematic effort to discover and remedy abuses, administrative
oversight or litigation aimed at obtaining injunctive relief may be
more effective than suits for damages. 37 Part II examines issues
related to deterrence.
Professor Schwartz's focus on the abolition of qualified immunity
is not the only path to strict liability. Some critics would overturn
Monell's "no vicarious liability" rule in order to eliminate the
hurdles plaintiffs face in obtaining relief.38 Their starting point is
Owen v. City of Independence,3 9 decided two years after Monell. That
case held that local governments have no immunity. 40 These
analysts would combine Owen with the elimination of Monell's "no
vicarious liability" rule. That proposed change in the municipal
liability doctrine would effectively create a regime that resembles
the "no qualified immunity" approach, though it would cover only
local governments. In one sense, this approach would amount to a
35 See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The LiabilityRule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L.
REv. 207 (2013) (arguing for the negligence principle).
36 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-85 (1992) (explaining why "backwardlooking" tort liability cannot effectively deter harmful conduct in the future).
37 For a discussion of other means of deterring constitutional violations, see generally
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as PrivateAttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247 (1988).
38 See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud,
and the Madness,
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 963 (2015) (advocating that the Court "revisit Monell" and
adopt "respondeat superior liability" for municipalities); JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 3, at
217-18 (collecting sources that "favor strict liability either of the officer defendant or the
government employer"). This idea must be distinguished from a version of vicarious liability
in which the government would be allowed to assert the officer's qualified immunity, as
suggested in Fallon, Bidding Farewell,supra note 24, at 978-79. Fallon's suggested approach
would probably streamline constitutional tort litigation by linking the plaintiff to the ultimate
source of recovery, but it would not impose strict liability. See id. at 979 ("[I]nsofar as
indemnification happens anyway, it would be better to dispel confusion about where financial
responsibility lies.").
39 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
40 See id. at 638 (holding that "municipalit[ies] may not assert the good faith of its officers
or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983" because "neither history nor policy supports
a construction of § 1983 that would justify . .. qualified immunity" for local governments).
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less radical, more incremental change than eliminating qualified
immunity altogether because the current regime already imposes
strict liability for unconstitutional acts by government
"policymakers"41

The policy issues that bear on this path to strict liability largely
track the "no qualified immunity" route-but they are not identical.
Variations between the two approaches will be noted from time to
time throughout this Article. In particular, the Court in Owen
advanced a distinct rationale for strict liability, suggesting that-as
in some other areas of modern tort law-strict liability may be
justified as a matter of "equitable loss-spreading."4 2 Governments
may be able to spread losses as well as the manufacturer of a
product, for example, because governments can cover the cost of
constitutional tort litigation by buying liability insurance. 43 The
loss-spreading rationale for strict liability is examined in Part III.

Both deterrence and loss spreading lend some support to the
adoption of some form of a strict liability regime. But strict
liability-whether by municipal vicarious liability or the
elimination of qualified immunity-would generate a new set of
constitutional litigation costs. First, indemnification shifts the cost
of liability from the officer to the government, but the cost does not
vanish. The cost is borne not only by governments and taxpayers,
but by the whole range of beneficiaries of government services. The
cost of liability would increase, perhaps substantially, as more
plaintiffs would recover in a world without the qualified immunity
defense or under vicarious liability theories. Second, the burden
imposed on local governments from expanded liability may subtly
influence judicial decisionmaking over time, thereby diluting
constitutional protections. Strict liability's success in assuring
greater vindication and deterrence over the short term would thus
generate substantial long-term costs. Third, Professor Schwartz

41 This point is illustrated by Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 474, 478-80
(1986), which held the city liable for the act of its policymaker, though the unconstitutionality
of that act was not established until several years later. See Michael L. Wells, The Role of
Fault in § 1983MunicipalLiability, 71 S.C. L. REv. 293, 295-96 (2019) (explaining how Owen
and Monell have created "a kind of strict liability ... when a local government's policy or
custom" violates a person's constitutional rights).
42 Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
4 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 420 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
the availability of civil-rights liability insurance to public entities).
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focuses solely on social costs versus vindication of rights. 44 But
either the abolition of qualified immunity or the imposition of
vicarious liability would raise a different kind of objection-one
based on fairness rather than costs and benefits. Long before
Harlow, the Court recognized that imposing liability on officers is
unfair when the law is in flux and they act in good faith, such that
they cannot reasonably foresee that their acts violate constitutional
rights.45 That fairness argument may have weight even when the
damages are paid by a government. It is no wonder that, despite the
Marbury dictum, 46 the Court has never embraced a general
principle that a remedy should be available for every violation of a
constitutional right. Part IV discusses these costs of eliminating
qualified immunity.
A cost-benefit approach to constitutional remedies does not imply
across-the-board rejection of strict liability. In some contexts, the
benefits of strict liability may be sufficiently strong, and the costs
sufficiently minor, to justify its adoption. Part V discusses two such
contexts. First, current municipal liability doctrine imposes strict
liability on local governments for unconstitutional acts by their
policymakers. 47 The cost-benefit approach supports that rule. The
second context would require a change in current law, but one that
seems to enjoy widespread support.4 8 Under the qualified immunity
doctrine, police officers cannot be held liable for excessive force
unless the plaintiff can show not only that the force was
unreasonable,4 9 but also that the officer made an unreasonable

44 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) ("Liability for damages for every
action which is found subsequently ... to have caused compensable injury would unfairly
impose ... the burden of mistakes made in good faith ... "); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
555 (1967) (stating that a police officer should be excused "from liability for acting under a
statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional").
46 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.").
47 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 650 (holding that qualified immunity does not cover "injuries
occasioned by a municipality's unconstitutional conduct").
48 For examples of criticisms of qualified immunity in the context of police excessive force
cases, see supra note 4.
49 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that excessive force claims "are
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard").
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mistake as to the reasonableness of the force. 50 This "two bites at
the apple" approach to reasonableness affords police officers more
protection against liability than they need or deserve, and on this
narrow issue, the case for abolishing qualified immunity is strong. 5 1
Efforts to reform the qualified immunity doctrine, including those
currently under consideration, would be on stronger ground if they
were to focus on this particular application of qualified immunity
instead of abolishing it altogether, as the Amash bill would for all
§ 1983 cases and the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020
would for all cases against correctional officers and local police. 52
Besides her emphasis on the superiority of eliminating qualified
immunity for vindicating rights, Professor Schwartz points out that
the abolition of qualified immunity would enable litigants to resolve
constitutional tort claims on the merits more quickly, at less cost.5 3
Part VI examines some of her specific criticisms of the current
constitutional tort regime. Many of abolition's benefits can be
obtained at lower cost by surgical interventions instead of the
wholesale overhaul she proposes. In particular, some of her
concerns could be alleviated simply by overturning the cases that
give rise to the complications: Pearson v. Callahan,54 which allows
courts to resolve qualified immunity issues without reaching the
merits, and Mitchell v. Forsyth,55 which allows many defendants to
obtain interlocutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity.
II. DETERRENCE
The deterrence rationale for constitutional tort liability follows
the economic approach to general tort law, which views liability
rules as tools to distinguish between acts that are and are not cost-

5O See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (stating that even if an officer applied
unreasonable force, qualified immunity still applies if "the mistaken belief was reasonable").
61 See Wells, supra note 13, at 426 ("[T]he rationale for a second bite at the apple is weaker
in excessive force cases .. .. ").
52 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
53 See Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 14, at 342-43 (noting that "[c]ivil
rights trials ... take far less time than qualified immunity motions and appeals take to
resolve," so "the defense may not actually reduce the cost, time, and complexity of litigation").
64 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) ("[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals
are in the best position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each case.").
55 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985).
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justified, actors as rational risk calculators, and liability for
damages as a disincentive to risk injury to others. The theory is that
these rational actors duly account for the threat of liability and
modify their behavior accordingly. 56 A key feature of relying on tort
litigation to deter is that liability for damages does not compel the
defendant to comply with the rule. 57 If the relevant actor finds that
the cost of compliance with the rule is higher than the benefit of
compliance, the actor is free to ignore the rule, obtain the benefits
of non-compliance, and pay damages. 58
This principle applies in the constitutional tort context as well. 59
In Carey v. Piphus, the leading case on constitutional tort damages,
the Court rejected the notion of using damages to obtain absolute
deterrence.6 0 It adopted the common law "compensation principle"
as the measure of constitutional tort damages. 61 As for deterrence,
"[t]o the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983
should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no
66 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972)
(explaining when liability for negligence should incentivize costly preventative measures and
when it should not). For a more systematic, less intuitive, development of this thesis, see
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-73

(1987).
67 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005) ("[A]n event, such as
a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.").
58 See Posner, supra note 56, at 33 ("When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of
prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident
victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.").
69 The constitutional tort context is not precisely parallel to the private law context.
Constitutional tort liability has distinctive "social costs," which include "the expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from acceptance of public office." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982);
see also id. (discussing "the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of
their duties"' (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949))). In Harlow, the
Court invoked those costs as grounds for qualified immunity. See id. at 817-18 ("[W]e
conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.").
Indemnification undercuts that rationale, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of government
Officers: PropertyRights and Official Accountability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 27 (1978),
but the costs do not vanish. They are shifted to government. For discussion of the role those
costs should play in setting the liability rule for constitutional torts, see infra Section IV.A.
60 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978) (explaining that punitive damages were not appropriate in
this case because "petitioners did not act with a malicious intention to deprive respondents
of their rights").
61 Id. at 255.
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evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable
than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages." 62 The
policy underlying this approach is that "it is excessively costly to
strictly minimize the abuse of power by government officials." 63
Accordingly, "the optimal level of abuse of power will be greater
than zero." 64 The goal, then, must be "optimal" deterrence, whichin the economic approach to torts-means that constitutional
violations would be deterred by liability rules up to the point at
which the costs of further deterrence would outweigh the benefits.
Thus, in the constitutional tort context, deterrence theory does not
promise a world in which no constitutional rights violations occur.
If that is the goal, some other enforcement mechanism must be
found, such as administrative regulation or injunctive relief.65
A. DOUBTS ABOUT DETERRENCE

Even with regard to ordinary torts, it is not clear just how much
the prospect of liability modifies behavior. 66 Effective deterrence
through tort litigation requires not only liability, but liability that
will influence the relevant actor's behavior. Doubts about the
effectiveness of tort-law incentives are compounded by mulcting
governments. 6 7 First, under the current doctrine, the measure of
damages in constitutional tort does not fully account for the value
of constitutional rights, thus providing insufficient incentives for
governments to curb officers' constitutional violations. 68 Second,
Id. at 256-57.
Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 673, 675 (2015).
641d.
62
63

65 See Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 24, at 972-73 (discussing injunctive relief);
Meltzer, supra note 37, at 265-76, 309-11 (discussing, e.g., habeas corpus, the exclusionary
rules, and class actions); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288-89 (1976) (discussing institutional reform litigation).
66 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 422-23 (1994) (finding "the strong version of the
deterrence argument" to be implausible, but also finding support for "the moderate form of
the deterrence argument," i.e., that tort liability has some deterrent effect).
67 See Meltzer, supra note 37, at 283-85 (discussing several reasons why a tort remedy may
not effectively deter).
68 See id. at 285 ("[F]rom the agency's standpoint, the value of misconduct in particular
cases . . . may seem to exceed the harm suffered by the victim of the illegality, especially when
discounted by the likelihood of suit and recovery."). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Damages for ConstitutionalViolations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in ConstitutionalTorts,
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governments act through their policymakers, but judgments are
paid by the governments. 69 The gap between the incentives of the
principal and those of the agent-a basic feature of agency lawsuggests that policymakers may have different incentives than the
particular government in whose name they act.
1. The Measure of Damages. Despite occasional large payouts in
high profile cases,7 0 damages awards are often small in
constitutional tort litigation. Part of the problem is that many
constitutional tort plaintiffs have had run-ins with the police and
may not elicit sympathy from a jury. 71 As Daniel Meltzer noted, "in
many cases the harm suffered by individuals from the constitutional
violation itself may be small, widely dispersed, and intangible,
providing little incentive for potential plaintiffs to sue." 72 Following
Carey's "compensation principle,"7 3 the Court in Memphis
Community School District v. Stachura rejected a jury instruction
that would have allowed recovery based on the abstract value of
constitutional rights and "the importance of the right[s] in our
system of government."74 Under Carey, the Court ruled, "no
compensatory damages [may] be awarded for violation of [a
constitutional] right absent proof of actual injury."75 Stachura does
not take a firm stand on the award of presumed damages, 76 and only

75 VA. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (discussing how to appropriately measure damages for
constitutional torts).
69 See, e.g., Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 15, at 890 ("Police officers are
virtually always indemnified. Between 2006 and 2011, in forty-four of the country's largest
jurisdictions, officers financially contributed to settlements and judgments in just .41% of the
approximately 9225 civil rights damages actions resolved in plaintiffs' favor ... ").
70 See, e.g., Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1034-36 (10th Cir. 2019) (upholding a $10
million jury award for the death of a pretrial detainee).
71 See Meltzer, supra note 37, at 284 (noting that "potential plaintiffs ...
are individuals
who are in contact with the criminal justice system" and who face a "lack of sympathy" from
juries).
72 Id.
7 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
74 477 U.S. 299, 303 (1986).
7 Id. at 308; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 372-73 (2000) (noting that this
rule produces "underdeterrence").
76 See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11 ("When a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury
that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may
possibly be appropriate."). The Court distinguished the faulty "value of constitutional rights"
instruction from a hypothetical "presumed damages" instruction:
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a few lower courts have adopted that approach. 77 Often, the plaintiff
receives only nominal damages. 78 In one recent case, a motorist was
illegally stopped and then incarcerated for sixty-five days. 79 He
received a recovery of one dollar.8 0 But a more general problem
exists, too. Punitive damages are sometimes only available against
an officer-not municipal governments 81-and only for egregious
misconduct. 82 Overall, the deterrent impact of constitutional tort
damages is probably real but not especially strong.
2. The Principal-AgentProblem. The second reason to doubt the
deterrent value of constitutional tort awards is that governments
ordinarily are complex enterprises that involve many actors. The
incentives of these actors do not always align with the goals of
avoiding § 1983 liability, in part because a principal-agent problem

[P]resumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered
and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure. As we
earlier explained, the instructions at issue in this case did not serve this purpose,
but instead called on the jury to measure damages based on a subjective evaluation
of the importance of particular constitutional values. Since such damages are
wholly divorced from any compensatory purpose, they cannot be justified as
presumed damages.

Id. at 303, 311. But the Court did not affirmatively endorse presumed damages.
77 See, e.g., King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 214 (6th Cir. 2015) ("[C]ourts have allowed
plaintiffs to recover presumed damages for actual injuries caused by constitutional violations
that are 'likely to have occurred' but difficult to measure, even when the injury claimed is
neither physical harm nor mental or emotional distress."); see also NAHMOD ET AL., supra note
4, at 567 (discussing cases in which courts have and have not been "receptive to presumed
damages" in lieu of "proving actual harm").
78 See, e.g., Grisham v. City of Fort Worth, 837 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2016) (describing a
consent decree in which the plaintiff received nominal damages of one dollar); Rentas v.
Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing when the court awards nominal damages
in response to a finding of a constitutional violation); Corpus v. Bennett, 430 F.3d 912, 916
(8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's reduction of "the damages award to a nominal
sum"); Schneider v. Cnty. of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining why
plaintiffs receive nominal damages "as a matter of law" when they provide a violation of their
constitutional rights).
79 Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2019).
80 See id. at 606 ("The decision regarding those damages was left to the jury, which
determined one dollar was the proper amount.").
81 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that
municipal governments are immune from liability for punitive damages).
82 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (explaining punitive damages are available
'when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others").
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exists: governments and government employees are two different
things. Governments act through agents, and in this context, as in
others, the interests of agents may often diverge from those of the
principal. 83

One group of agents consists of the government's policymakers.
Since policymakers are not themselves liable-or likely will be
indemnified if they are-officers in charge of allocating government
resources may actually pay more attention to their "[p]olitical

preferences," 84 than to a detached assessment of the government's
costs and benefits. Suppose, for example, the local electorate favors
vigorous law enforcement. Even if the police are regularly sued, and
even if (in the hypothesized world of vicarious liability or "no
qualified immunity") the municipality is regularly held liable, it is
unlikely that the police chief will take strong steps to avoid
constitutional violations in a way that diminishes vigorous law
enforcement. This is true whether the liability rule is strict liability
or negligence. The violations cost the police chief nothing
personally, while the continued vigorous law enforcement serves to
enhance her public image. Similarly, a school district
superintendent, knowing that the government will pay the damages
if he is sued, may further his own career by suppressing the critical
speech of teachers, even though the First Amendment protects that
speech. As a result of this self-aggrandizing behavior, the
government's conduct may have little to do with traditional costbenefit calculation. 85
The police chief and school superintendent in these hypotheticals
qualify as policymakers for § 1983 purposes, 86 but the principalagent problem is not confined to policymaking officials. The problem
exists whenever a misalignment exists between the incentive
structure of the person whose behavior is targeted by the legal rule
and the incentives the legal rule aims to create. Suppose the police
chief and superintendent strive to enforce the First and Fourth

83 See Levinson, supra note 75, at 380 (discussing how "agency 'slippage' or 'drift' makes
the consequences of constitutional cost remedies . . . difficult to predict").
84Id. at 355.
85 See Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1441 (1997) ("[T]here is no

basis for simply ascribing rational behavior to political institutions.").
86 See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997) ("Our cases on the liability of
local governments under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final
policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.").
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Amendments. Lower-level officials, such as school principals and
police officers also seek to get ahead in their careers, and they may
not be deterred by their supervisors' oversight efforts. In sum, as
Professor Levinson notes, "[s]treet-level officials will often have the
incentives and means to pursue their own objectives, which may
well deviate from managerial preferences," 87 to the detriment of
effective deterrence of constitutional violations.
B. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

The problems discussed in Section A are best understood as
reasons to doubt the efficacy of deterrence rather than as decisive
objections to the deterrence rationale. Governments buy liability
insurance and have an incentive to keep rates down. 88 Despite low
damages, and despite the principal-agent problem, plenty of
evidence suggests that liability insurers pressure governments to
minimize constitutional tort liability. 89 Thus, deterrence probably
works to some extent.90
On that premise, the next question is which liability rule is best
suited to deter constitutional violations. The liability rule choices
are not limited to strict liability or current law. Another alternative
could be to impose liability upon a showing of "fault," as that term
is generally defined in traditional negligence law: proof that the
relevant officer could reasonably foresee that his act would result in
a constitutional violation and that he failed to take proper
precautions to avoid the violation. 91 For plaintiffs, this approach
would present a lower hurdle than current law without wholly
eliminating the qualified immunity defense. In order to isolate and
Levinson, supra note 75, at 384.
See, e.g., John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1539, 1542 (2017) ("Municipalities nationwide purchase insurance to indemnify
themselves against liability for the acts of their law enforcement officers.").
89 See id. at 1573-95 (discussing insurers' loss-prevention practices as a form of private
regulation of public actors).
90 See id. at 1547 ("[I]nsurers transform vague, uncertain liability exposure into finely
grained policies backed by differentiated premiums and the threat of coverage denial. That
is a substantial part of how civil liability deters misconduct in insured jurisdictions.").
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will
result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.").
87
88
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analyze the comparative merits of strict liability versus these
alternative liability rules, the ensuing discussion brackets the
principal-agent and measure-of-damages problems noted in Section
A and stipulates that deterrence is a significant goal of
constitutional tort law.
1. Strict Liability vs. Current Doctrine. Imposing vicarious
liability or eliminating qualified immunity would increase payouts,
intensify pressure from insurance companies, and probably achieve
more deterrence than the current qualified immunity doctrine.
Deterrence cannot occur without the threat of liability, and the
current doctrine often produces no liability.92 Indeed, Professor
Schwartz's "no qualified immunity" proposal derives much of its
normative force from the defendant-friendly features of the current
official immunity doctrine. 93 Thus, constitutional tort deterrence
does not apply at all to some officers because they are absolutely
immune from damages. 94 Most officers are immune from damages
if "any" reasonable officer could have believed that he was acting
constitutionally. 95 The Court recently stated that "qualified
immunity protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law."' 96 The plaintiff cannot even win by
showing that the particular officer acted with an unconstitutional
motive or believed he was acting unconstitutionally, so long as
(presumably) a single reasonable officer would believe the act to be
constitutionally valid. 97
The qualified-immunity obstacle is exacerbated because many
constitutional doctrines are flexible standards rather than brightline rules, including doctrines that generate a steady stream of

92 See, e.g., Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 15, at 953 (explaining how
widespread indemnification for police officers "frustrates § 1983's deterrence goals by limiting
the impact of compensatory and punitive damages awards on individual officers").
93 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014)).
96 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
97 See Wells, supra note 13, at 422 ("[Q]ualified immunity inquiries focus solely on the state
of the law at the time of the constitutional violation, thus excluding evidence of a defendant's
impermissible motives or reckless disregard of a plaintiffs constitutional rights.").

2021]

OBJECTIONS TO STRICT LIABILITY

1297

constitutional tort litigation. 98 These include, for example, public
employee speech cases, which often require courts to balance the
value of the speech against its potential for disruption, 99 and police
excessive force cases, which turn on an evaluation of all of the
circumstances of the encounter between the officer and the
plaintiff.10 0 In such cases, the "clearly established law" issue is more
accurately described as "clearly established application of law to
fact."10 1 Since the facts vary from case to case, the law bearing on
the specific encounter is often uncertain.
By focusing on "clearly established law" rather than common
sense notions of fault, courts have awarded qualified immunity for
a broad range of dubious official conduct. Government officials have
avoided liability when they fired a professor for testifying truthfully
at a criminal trial,10 2 when they left a man tied to a pole in a parking
lot in the middle of the night,1 03 and when they simply stole the
plaintiffs property. 104 They have also avoided liability on the ground
that a reasonable officer might distinguish between the front door
of a plaintiffs house-as to which clearly established law precluded
his entry-and the door of an attached garage,1 05 or between
eyeglasses-which clearly established law required prison officers
to provide to inmates-and hearing aids.106

98 For a brief summary of the difference between rules and standards, and how the Court
approaches choosing between the two, see Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124
YALE L.J. 644, 646 (2014).
99 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (outlining the Court's balancing test for
evaluating infringements on public employees' free expression rights).
100 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (explaining that assessment of
excessive force claims "requires a careful balancing" of the parties' interests and "careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case").
101 See Wells, supra note 13, at 431-32.
102 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014).
103 Robles v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 262, 266, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2002).
104 Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 939-40, 942 (9th Cir. 2019).
105 See Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1016-17 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that
the law was not clearly established because it was not "a matter of obvious clarity[ that] an
open attached garage is either a part of the home, or entitled to the same level of protection
as the home").
106 See Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 274-75 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that while the
court had "long held that deprivation of needed eyeglasses ... stated an Eighth Amendment
violation," the court could "find precious little case law addressing an official's failure to
supply a severely hearing impaired inmate with hearing aids").
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Suits against local governments often fail for similar reasons.
Monell and Owen impose strict liability for constitutional violations
committed by policymakers but require "deliberate indifference"-a
higher-than-negligence showing of culpability-in a clear majority
of cases in which the violation is committed by a subordinate.10 7
When plaintiffs try to sidestep qualified immunity by suing local
governments for unconstitutional acts committed by lower-level
officials, they are often thwarted by the "deliberate indifference"
requirement. In Connick v. Thompson, for example, a jury in New
Jersey convicted the plaintiff of murder and sentenced him to
death.10 8 He proved that lower-level prosecutors had violated his
109 to obtain
constitutional right, under Brady v. Maryland,
exculpatory evidence and that the local district attorney's office had
a history of Brady violations, with four convictions overturned in
the past decade.11 0 His Monell theory against the city was that the
district attorney, a policymaker, inadequately trained his
assistants.1 The jury-properly instructed under the "deliberate
indifference" standard-held the city liable under that test.1 1 2 But
the Supreme Court reversed.11 3 The Court explained that deliberate
indifference is a "stringent standard of fault,"1 1 4 that "[a] pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
'ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train,"1 15 and that none of the earlier four
conviction reversals were sufficiently similar to this one because
"[n]one of those cases involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a
crime lab report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind." 116

107 See, e.g., Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) ("A showing of
simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice."); supra note 12.
108 563 U.S. 51, 54-55 (2011).
109 See 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that the suppression of a confession violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
110 Connick, 563 U.S. at 57, 62 (finding that the prosecutor's office had committed a Brady
violation and that four previous convictions had been overturned due to Brady violations).
111 Id. at 59; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (recognizing the
"inadequate training" theory).
112 Connick, 563 U.S. at 57.

113

Id.

at 72.

114

Id.

at 61 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).

Id. at 62 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
116 Id. at 62-63; see also Wells, supra note 41, at 306-12 (discussing lower court cases
115

concerning liability for poor training, supervision, and hiring).
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2. Strict Liability vs. Negligence. In light of the current doctrine's
shortcomings, strict liability would surely win the deterrence
comparison between the two. But the case for strict liability is
weaker when it is compared to a less government-protective
alternative than the current doctrine. Some of the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence supports the application of
general negligence principles to decide qualified immunity issues.11 7
This approach would borrow the common law "reasonable person"
test, would require officers to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances, and would procure many of the benefits of "no
qualified immunity" without incurring many of its costs. On
occasion, the Court has taken a similar route. In Hope v. Pelzer, for
example, the Court said that the purpose of qualified immunity is
to provide "fair notice" to the official that his act is
unconstitutional.1 1 8 On that premise, the Court required the
defendant to draw reasonable inferences from earlier cases, even
where no prior case featured "materially similar" facts.1 1 9
In Hope, an Alabama prisoner, on a hot summer day, was
attached to a hitching post and denied drinking water for eight
hours as punishment for his disobedience.1 20 An earlier case from
the same circuit court, Ort v. White, held that a prisoner could be
denied water until he complied with orders, 12 1 but the court
distinguished such "necessary coercive measures" from punishment
for prior misbehavior, which would violate the Eighth
Amendment. 122 Thus, Ort distinguished a hypothetical fact pattern
117 The role of fault in these qualified immunity cases is not that negligence should serve
as the general standard of care, as it does, for example, in tort suits arising from traffic
accidents. Qualified immunity is a context in which the "function of negligence is to serve as
a secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal norm." Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions
of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 317 (2002). Thus,
the relevant aspect of the behavior is the officer's state of mind with respect to the
constitutionality of the act. Unless he can reasonably foresee that the act is unconstitutional,
he is no more blameworthy than someone who uses force in self-defense under a mistaken,
but reasonable, belief that his victim is attacking him. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 21 & cmt. h (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2020)
(recognizing a defense in this situation).
118 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
119 Id. at 739-41.
120 Id. at 734-35.
121 813 F.2d 318, 325 (11th Cir. 1987).
122 Id. at 327; see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 743 (examining how the Eleventh Circuit explained
the distinction between "necessary coercive measures" from punishment in Ort).
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roughly similar to the facts of Hope, in which the prisoner was
punished by denial of drinking water after he was willing to obey
orders and was no longer resisting. 123 Hope explained that the
"premise" of Ort, along with other materials, gave "fair warning"
that such punishment, as distinguished from "coercive measures"
aimed at eliciting compliance with orders, would violate the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment right. 124

Hope clearly implies that officers are required to draw inferences.
Drawing on Hope, some scholars have suggested that the qualified
immunity doctrine may be reformed by adopting a rule akin to
common law negligence, under which officers would be liable when
they could reasonably foresee that their acts would violate a
plaintiffs constitutional right. 125 If that principle were consistently
enforced, officers would be held liable when they fail to draw
reasonable inferences-a norm that has stood the test of time in
common law torts. 126 Officers would be obliged to infer that garage
doors are like front doors, that hearing aids are like eye glasses, and
that they are not allowed to steal. 127 As applied to local
governments, a case like Connick v. Thompson would come out in
the plaintiffs favor under a negligence test. 128 Even if the Court was
right in finding that the four earlier reversals did not provide
enough notice to meet the "deliberate indifference" test, 129 the
reversals certainly would suffice to show negligence on the part of
the district attorney in his training and supervision of assistants. 130

123 See Hope, 536 U.S. at 743 ("Hope was not restrained at the worksite until he was willing
to return to work. Rather, he was removed back to the prison and placed under conditions
that threatened his health.").

1241d.

See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 35, at 259-60 ("[Q]ualified immunity should hew closely to
notice as a proxy for fault. . . . Notice as a proxy for fault does not require a precedent
precisely on point. . . . Notice is, or should be, a broader and more practical concept than the
search for a factually similar precedent.").
126 See id. at 259-63 (discussing the applicability of this reformed standard to instances
where a reasonable officer should have known of the illegality of their actions).
127 See Wells, supra note 13, at 431-38 (discussing how a looser standard for liability would
apply to previously decided cases); supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
129 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) ("Those four reversals could not have
put Connick on notice that the office's Brady training was inadequate with respect to the sort
of Brady violation at issue here.").
130 See id. (noting that "courts had overturned four convictions because of Brady violations
by prosecutors in Connick's office").
125
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Does strict liability, in either the "no qualified immunity" or
vicarious liability version, more strongly deter violations than a
general negligence principle? It might be thought that strict liability
is more dissuasive than fault because it imposes liability for all
violations, not just those violations that involve a policymaker's
negligence.1

31

But economic analysis of common law torts suggests

caution. 132

If that analysis applies to constitutional torts as well, it
is not clear that more liability will result in fewer violations.
Deterrence works by forcing an actor to account for the costs and
benefits of his act. A simple economic model implies that, under
negligence, a government is liable when the costs of precautions are
lower than the benefits of implementing them.1 33 If (as I am
stipulating in this Section) the officer's interests are aligned with
those of the government, he will take precautions in those instances.
Strict liability would hold the government liable when the costs of
precautions are greater than the benefits. But it does not follow that
the officer will take further precautions in order to avoid liability. A
rational officer, seeking to minimize overall costs to the
government, would prefer to incur a cost rather than take a
precaution that costs more than it is worth. 134
This brief account does not encompass every consideration that
might favor one rule over the other, but it does suggest that the
actual difference between strict liability and negligence in deterring
violations is probably small, at least in private tort law.1 35 Why?
See Jeffries, supra note 35, at 240 ("Across-the-board strict liability would make
damages for constitutional violations routine and would thereby heighten the disincentives
for governments to engage in conduct that might result in constitutional violations.").
132 See, e.g., supra notes 36, 66 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
134 See Posner, supra note 56, at 32 ("If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment ...
exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would
be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention."); id. at 33 ("Where the
measures necessary to avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources, there is
no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them."); id. at 41 ("Punishment
for negligence would close an important safety valve in the negligence system. A standard of
care is necessarily a crude approximation to optimality. Allowing enterprises a choice
whether to comply or pay the social costs of violation may permit a closer approximation.").
131

135 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 202 (5th ed.

2017) (comparing negligence with strict liability and finding that "the choice is often
problematic"); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider,
78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1313-20 (1992) (comparing the fault standard's optimal care test with
strict liability's "cheapest cost-avoider" test).
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Because even under strict liability, rational actors in the private
sphere will not invest resources to stop injuries when the cost of
paying for them is lower than the cost of preventing them. For
constitutional torts, the implication is that, under both approaches,
decisionmakers will sometimes find it justifiable to risk
constitutional violations when the costs of preventing them are
prohibitive.1 36 It follows that strict municipal liability is unlikely to
result in a significantly lower number of constitutional violations
than would a rule of reasonable care for a constant level of
government

activity. 137

For

example,

suppose

policymakers

determine that violations of the Fourth Amendment's limits on
"stop and frisk" practices produce great benefits in law enforcement
that are worth the low liability costs, even if all victims sue and
win. 138 In such a case, the level of deterrence effectuated by strict
liability and negligence-based liability would seem to be much the
same.

This convergence of strict liability and negligence does not mean
that there are no grounds for preferring one over the other. Two
differences between the rules are relevant to the choice between
them. First, strict liability is simpler to administer because it avoids
litigating the negligence issue. This point is important because it

suggests that the default position should be in favor of strict
liability. For example, this difference is an important basis for the
strict products liability rule for manufacturing defects. 139 If the two
See, e.g., Kramer & Sykes, supra note 19, at 284-85 (arguing that both strict and
negligence-based liability "can motivate the municipality to adopt cost-effective measures to
reduce the incidence of misconduct"); see also Vermeule, supra note 63, at 675, 678 (arguing
that "it is excessively costly to strictly minimize the abuse of power by government officials,"
and that "given positive costs of enforcing constitutional rules, and competing uses for the
relevant resources, some level of official abuse of power will be inevitable").
137 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 19, at 285 (noting the similar outcomes and suggesting
that "by singling out negligent supervisory officials and identifying the measures that they
should have taken, a negligence-based approach to vicarious liability might be more effective
than strict vicarious liability at motivating cost-effective monitoring, training, and similar
measures: negligence cases would generate a body of information about required
precautionary measures for the guidance of other municipalities").
138 This is a plausible assumption since plaintiffs may not recover based on the abstract
value of constitutional rights but only for the harm they have suffered. See supra note 75-76
and accompanying text.
139 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that use of a negligence rule would be "needlessly
circuitous").
136
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approaches produce similar deterrence and one costs less to
administer than the other, then strict liability should be favored
unless there are good reasons to favor negligence. But the
constitutional tort context may differ from products liability in this
regard. Part IV, below, suggests that good reasons do exist to depart
from this default position in constitutional torts because the costs of
strict liability may be higher than fault.
Second, studies of ordinary tort law suggest that the choice of
strict liability over negligence will affect defendants' "activity level,"
a term borrowed from the jargon of economic analysis of torts. 1 40 It
reflects the intuition that the more an activity costs us, the less of it
we will do. Because the costs of an activity are higher under strict
liability, people will engage in less of that activity under strict
liability than under negligence. 141 In ordinary tort law, the "activity
level" rationale may help explain the rule that actors are strictly
liable for abnormally dangerous activities, such as transporting
hazardous materials. 142 But this factor may cut in the opposite
direction in the constitutional tort context. What is good policy for
abnormally dangerous activities may not be good policy for judicial
oversight of government. In particular, the "activity level" factor
suggests that strict liability would lead to less policing, imprisoning,
schooling, and governing activity that can produce constitutional
violations. But it is far from clear that the overall benefits to society
of this outcome would justify its costs, even if one consequence is a
reduced number of constitutional violations. Unlike abnormally
dangerous activities, policing and educating are probably not among
the

"class of activities ...

in which activity-level

changes

by

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (4th ed. 1992) ("[P]otential
injurers subject to a rule of strict liability will automatically take into account possible
changes in activity level . .. in deciding whether to prevent accidents.").
141 See id. at 176-77 (explaining how strict liability rules reduce activity level); Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1980) (explaining that a
strict liability rule induces potential tortfeasors to consider both their level of care and their
level of activity).
142 See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990) (explaining the activity level rationale behind holding a shipper of hazardous chemicals
strictly liable for the consequences of a spill).
140
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potential injurers appear to be the most efficient method of accident
prevention." 143
III. LOSS SPREADING

In ordinary tort law, compensation to the injured person and
spreading the loss are sometimes considered distinct rationales for
strict liability. 144 Thus, Justice Roger Traynor favored strict liability
for defective products because, among other things, "the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business." 145 In Owen v. City of
Independence,146 the U.S. Supreme Court touched on this
development in the common law and seemed to accord it a role in
constitutional torts. Justice Brennan wrote in his opinion for the
Court: "No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of
liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as
a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct." 147 Other
than this observation, the Court did not discuss loss spreading in
Owen, and it has not relied on this policy in the forty years since
Owen. A fair assessment is that the status of loss-spreading as a
rationale for § 1983 strict liability remains unclear, at best.
A. THE VALUE OF LOSS SPREADING

The theory behind loss spreading is that strict liability will
transfer funds from the defendant to the injured person, lessening
the victim's harm. 148 This gain in welfare occurs even if the
143 POSNER, supra note 140, at 177-78; see also Kramer & Sykes, supra note 19, at 286
(noting that, in the public sector, "even if greater cost internalization would reduce the scale
of activity, it is impossible to know whether such a reduction would be beneficial").
144 It is important to note, however, that compensation as a tort "norm" can be defended,
without resort to reliance on loss spreading, as a means of implementing "the value of
individual autonomy or equal freedom." Mark A. Geistfeld, Compensation as a Tort Norm, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 65, 66 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).

145 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
146 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
147 Id. at 657.
148 See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for
Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 341, 351 (1996) ("The underlying
premise for loss-spreading is that accident costs should be 'collectively, not individually,
borne,' because a loss causes less social and economic disruption if it is shared by many
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defendant is not negligent or otherwise blameworthy and even if the
transfer does not achieve greater deterrence than it would under
negligence liability. Of course, the funds that are transferred to the
victim come from the defendant. How, then, does the transfer result
in any net gain? The answer lies in a concept called "the increasing
marginal disutility of loss."149 A huge loss to the victim of a major
injury will cause considerable harm, or "disutility," to that person.
But suppose the loss can be distributed over a large group of people
by slightly adding to the price of a product or increasing taxes to
residents of a municipality. By comparison, the disutility felt by
each of the purchasers or taxpayers-even when added altogetherwill be lower than the disutility felt by the victim of a devastating
physical injury.1 50 Thus, holding an actor liable who can spread
losses, such as a product manufacturer or a municipal government,
can diminish the overall disutility. 151 Putting aside the vocabulary
of welfare economics and stating the point in commonsense terms:
The loss would be a crushing blow if the victim were left to absorb
all of it. That loss is diminished when spread because each of those
who pays a tiny fraction of it suffers a minuscule loss. Even when
all of those losses are added together, they amount to less than the
harm that the uncompensated victim would suffer.
A variation on this line of reasoning is that, even without
spreading, the "diminishing disutility" goal may be satisfied by
identifying a defendant with a "deep pocket," or plenty of money.
Such a defendant may be so well off that even a $100 loss will cause
him less disutility than the injured plaintiff would suffer if no
payment was made. 152 In practice, however, "loss spreading" and

people." (footnote omitted) (quoting Michael J. Trebilcock, The Future of Tort Law: Mapping
the Contours of the Debate, 15 CAN. BUS. L.J. 471, 472 (1989))).
149 Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Remedies: Reconciling Official Immunity with the
Vindication of Rights, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713, 721 (2014).
150 See id. ("This principle holds that as a monetary loss increases, the amount of well-being
that is lost-'disutility'-goes up disproportionately to the amount of money that is lost. Thus,
a loss of $100 may produce more disutility to one person than it would if one thousand people
each paid ten cents into a fund to compensate the injured person.").
151 See, e.g., MARK A. GEISTEELD, TORT LAw: THE ESSENTIALS 42-43 (3d ed. 2008)
(discussing "[c]ompensation of [i]njuries" by spreading losses).
152 See Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law ("[T]otal disutility will in theory be reduced, again
because of the diminishing marginal utility of money, by shifting a $100 loss from someone
worth $100 to someone else worth $1,000."), in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 57, 68 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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the "deep pocket" theme tend to converge because most defendants
with deep pockets are businesses that can spread losses by raising
prices, or, in the constitutional tort context, governments that can
spread losses by raising taxes.
B. LOSS SPREADING AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

The central point is that, under any version of the "diminishing
disutility" rationale, "loss spreading" (or compensation) is a means
toward that goal rather than an end. Again, one can easily lose sight
of that point. It is plausible to describe both the means employed
and the goal achieved as compensation, yet that description of the
goal is incomplete and imprecise. The goal is not merely to
compensate, but to diminish the amount of disutility (the end) by
compensating from a certain type of source (the means). Absent
spreading or deep pockets, the "diminishing disutility" goal simply
is not realized. There seems to be no coherent argument that simply
taking $100 from A and giving it to B will diminish the disutility of
the loss.
Apart from the brief reference in Owen, neither loss spreading
nor the "deep pocket" theory has gained a foothold in constitutional
tort doctrine. One reason may be that Justice Brennan, the author
of the Court's opinion in Owen, was more willing than most of the
Justices to rely candidly on modern tort policy.153 Another likely
reason is that the emphasis on compensation in general tort theory
is strongest in contexts in which losses are typically great, such as
the types of physical injuries that often result from defective
products. Those are the contexts in which the injured person's
welfare is most seriously jeopardized and the case for loss spreading
is strongest. By contrast, constitutional torts often involve small
monetary claims, if only because § 1983 juries cannot be instructed
to consider the value of the constitutional right in awarding
damages for a violation. 15 4 A third reason-and to my mind the

153 Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-48 (1983) (Brennan, J., writing for the Court)
(discussing historical to present day view of punitive damages), with id. at 66 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The decisions of state courts decided well after 1871, while of some academic
interest, are largely irrelevant to what Members of the 42d Congress intended by way of a
standard for punitive damages.").
154 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (holding that "no compensatory damages could be awarded for
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decisive one-is that the loss-spreading rationale, by its own logic,
gives no weight to either the deterrence rationale or the costs of
strict liability. Those costs are discussed in Part IV.
IV. COSTS OF STRICT LIABILITY

As discussed, strict liability-whether by abolition of qualified
immunity or by vicarious liability-would produce benefits in the
form of more effective vindication of rights, streamlined litigation of
constitutional tort claims, and some loss spreading. It is not so clear
that strict liability would more effectively deter constitutional
violations. Even if it does, neither deterrence nor corrective justice
nor loss spreading should overpower all countervailing
considerations in § 1983 damages litigation. The remaining
question is whether those benefits are worth their associated costs.
Such costs are not measured in dollars. One cost, discussed in
Section A, relates to the distribution of public resources. The second,
addressed in Section B, concerns the long-term impact of abolishing
qualified immunity on the content of constitutional rights. Section C
addresses the third issue: whether strict liability would be fair to
defendants. All three of these costs weigh against strict liability.
Part V suggests that strict liability may be appropriate for a limited
set of cases, though, despite its costs.
A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Both deterrence and corrective justice rationales ignore the
impact of liability rules on distributive justice. Deterrence theory
holds that liability should be imposed on the actor who can take the
cheapest precaution. 155 The implication is that, as between a poor
person who has the cheapest precaution, call him Al, and a richer
person who could take similar-albeit more expensiveprecautions, call him Bob, liability should attach to Al. Similarly, a
core principle of corrective justice is that the wrongdoer cannot

violation of that right absent proof of actual injury" because "the abstract value of a
constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages").
155 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEo. L.J. 513, 549-50 (2003)
("[T]he economic deterrence analyst will want to know not only what precautions are efficient
to take, but who is the 'cheapest cost avoider'-the actor in a position to implement those
precautions most cheaply.").
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circumstances

that

are

irrelevant to the wrong itself.156 The defendant has an obligation of
corrective justice even if the victim is rich and the tortfeasor is poor
and even if the victim is evil and the tortfeasor is virtuous. Tort
theorists describe this point by distinguishing between corrective
justice and "distributive justice," which involves the general
fairness of the distribution of wealth and other benefits. 157
Corrective justice is widely seen as the dominant aspect of justice in
ordinary tort law, which generates litigation focused on narrowly
framed private interests on both sides. 158
When plaintiffs seek damages from local governments, either
through direct liability or indemnification, the values served by
distributive justice carry more weight than they do in ordinary tort
law because governments, by definition, make distributive justice
decisions. 159 Moreover, in § 1983 municipal liability cases, payment
to a constitutional tort victim will not come from a private
tortfeasor, but from funds that would otherwise be spent on some
public purpose-including programs that may have benefited the
constitutional tort victim or persons more deserving of aid than the
victim. These programs include education, social services, road
maintenance, health care, police and fire protection, and all other
functions of local government. As a practical matter, the choice may
be between paying for constitutional torts and helping people who
have suffered, or who are threatened by, more serious misfortunes
than constitutional torts. In the short run, taxes could be increased
to fund the extra liability, but at some point, taxpayers likely would
resist the tax hikes. In the end, constitutional tort liability

156 See id. at 570 (stating that the aim of corrective justice is to "order[] that the full value
of the loss be transferred to the responsible party via a damage payment equal to the value
of the loss").
157 See Levinson, supra note 75, at 407-08 (distinguishing distributive from corrective
justice).
158 See Jules L. Coleman, The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice ("The claims of corrective justice
are limited or restricted to parties who bear some normatively important relationship to one
another. A person does not ... have a claim in corrective justice to repair in the air, against

no one in particular."), in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 66-67 (David G.

Owen ed., 1995).
159 See Levinson, supra note 75, at 413 & n.230 (suggesting that there is a division of labor
between distributive justice, which is "primarily relevant to the political process and public
law," and corrective justice, which is "primarily relevant to judicial resolution of private law
disputes").
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doubtlessly can and does displace other uses of public funds.
Governments may respond to strict liability by engaging in less of
the activity that produces liability, again with unhappy
consequences. For example, to the extent governments curb
aggressive policing in order to diminish liability costs, all citizens
will be exposed to greater risk of crime.16 0
This public/private distinction highlights a basic difference
between common law torts and constitutional torts. The former deal
with the rights and obligations of persons who are "juridical equals,"
while the latter involve "relationships of juridical inequality." 16 1
More importantly, the public/private distinction has a bearing on
the selection of the proper liability rule for constitutional tort
actions under § 1983. Governmental strict liability for
constitutional torts is a form of "enterprise liability," 162 which
"expresses the maxim that those who profit from the imposition of
risk should bear the costs of the accidents that are a price of their
profits."16 3 With constitutional torts, however, the residents of the
municipality will, to a significant extent, comprise both sets: those
who are at risk from constitutional violations by government and
those who benefit from the constitutional violations.
Since constitutional tort liability would interfere with functions
that benefit the public as a whole, the public/private distinction
furnishes a rationale for rejecting qualified immunity or imposing
vicarious municipal liability. Indeed, Professor Daryl Levinson even
asserts that the public/private distinction "would seem to exclude
compensation for constitutional torts from the corrective sphere." 164
Levinson may overstate the force of the distinction because it does
not necessarily "exclude" the possibility of liability based on a
corrective justice theory. 165 Levinson is right, however, in
recognizing that constitutional tort liability is far removed from
private tort liability because of the demands of distributive justice.
This "unintended deterrence" problem is discussed at length in John C. Jeffries, Jr., In
Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 73-78 (1998).
161 Peter Cane, Tort Law and Public Functions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 144, at 148, 148-49.
162 See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 3, at 217-18 (discussing the Court's rejection of any
immunity defense for local governments and citing sources that favor general strict liability).
163 Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2001).
164 Levinson, supra note 75, at 413.
160

165

Id
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The key point is that the legitimate activities of government are
very real, and, therefore, they must play some role in determining
the scope of governmental liability for constitutional torts.
B. THE VALUE OF A GAP BETWEEN RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
For many purposes, separating constitutional remedies from

constitutional rights may be helpful so as to focus on the distinctive
issues raised by each body of the doctrine. But the relations between
the two cannot always be ignored: "[r]ights are dependent on
remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their
scope, shape, and very existence." 166 When the issue is whether to
abolish qualified immunity, as Professor Schwartz proposes, a
decision to loosen restrictions on remedies may well lead to weaker
substantive constitutional protections.
Richard Fallon and John Jeffries have reflected at length on this
topic. They have shown that these sorts of rights/remedies tradeoffs can and do occur. Professor Fallon discerns in the case law on
constitutional litigation a theme he calls the "EquilibrationThesis,"
which holds that "substantive rights, causes of action to enforce
rights, rules of pleading and proof, and immunity doctrines all are
flexible and potentially adjustable components of a package of
rights and enforcement mechanisms that should be viewed, and
assessed for desirability, as a whole." 167 One implication of the
equilibration thesis is that "when courts regard the social costs of
the existing bundle of rights and enforcement mechanisms as
excessive, they might consider calibrating adjustments in any of the
components of the package." 168 The equilibration thesis cannot
predict with certainty the implications of any given change in
remedial rules, but it does suggest that broader remedies may lead
to "further, equilibrating adjustments." 169 To illustrate this thesis
in the constitutional tort context, Fallon focuses mainly on official
immunity, but he notes that the same reasoning applies to
municipal liability. 170 Remedial equilibration suggests that, over
166 Daryl J. Levinson,

Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.

857, 858 (1999).
167 Fallon, supra note 25, at 480.

at 482.
Id. at 486.
170 Id. at 497-98.
168
169

1d.
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time, a remedial expansion is likely to dilute constitutional rights. 17 1
Thus, even for the remedial maximalist, the ultimate effect of
imposing strict § 1983 liability on municipalities may be deeply
disappointing. Doing so could cause courts to contract rights, so as

to make fewer forms of government conduct actionable in the first
place. 172 And if this sort of constitutional boomerang effect occurs,
remedial maximalists are likely to find themselves in a world in
which even fewer plaintiffs can secure any § 1983 remedy at all. In
short, the result may be no overall gain-or even a diminution-in
the general level of protection of those rights.
Professor Jeffries adds a dynamic dimension to this line of
analysis. He highlights that constitutional law gradually evolves as
new problems arise and as attitudes change about the appropriate
scope of constitutional protection. 173 Absent limits on damages
liability, constitutional innovation will become especially costly
because persons who have good constitutional claims under the
hypothesized new regime could sue for damages that governments
could not have anticipated and planned for. 174 Judges may hesitate
to recognize new rights out of concern for the disruption of effective
government that can result from new and costly burdens imposed
by abrupt changes in constitutional law. In other words, according
to Jeffries, "limiting money damages for constitutional violations
fosters the development of constitutional law .

.

. by reducing the

costs of innovation." 175 Jeffries recognizes that persons with
constitutional claims at the time of the innovation will find
themselves without a "backward-looking" remedy. 176 He counts this
as a cost but views it as one worth bearing. In his view, the overall
171 See Levinson, supra note 23, at 887 ("[R]ights can be effectively enlarged, abridged, or
eviscerated by expanding, contracting, or eliminating remedies. School desegregation, for
example, is a case of remedial expansion of the Brown right.").
172 See Fallon, supra note 25, at 487 ("Without official immunity, the Court might begin to
interpret § 1983 . . . so that it would provide a cause of action to sue for damages for only a
subset of constitutional violations.").
173 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 96-97 (1999) (providing several examples of how "the constitutional agenda is constantly
changing").
174 See id. at 109 ("It is precisely in these cases [of constitutional uncertainty or innovation]
that the curtailment of money damages serves the useful purposes of avoiding excessive
inhibition of the legitimate activities of government and reducing the costs of constitutional
change.").
17 Id. at 90.

176 Id
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impact of liability-limiting doctrines is "a healthy bias toward the
forward-looking." 177

Professor Schwartz challenges the validity of Fallon and
Jeffries's concerns. 178 She asserts that "over the past fifty years, the
Supreme Court has progressively strengthened
qualified
immunity's protections for defendants on the one hand, and
weakened plaintiffs' substantive constitutional protections on the
other." 179 The first claim is accurate, but the second is not-at least
with respect to the types of constitutional protections that generate
a significant amount of constitutional tort litigation. For example,
in Board of Regents v. Roth 180 and Perry v. Sindermann,181 the Court
recognized that the "property" and "liberty" guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment were not limited to common law interests
but also applied to government jobs and other benefits. 182 This
doctrinal shift continues to produce litigation over the scope and
application of due process protections. 183 The Court has recognized
that the Due Process Clause applies to involuntary commitment to
mental hospitals 184 and to the treatment of mental patients. 185 It
has ruled that egregious misbehavior by officials violates the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause; 186 that pretrial
detainees are entitled to heightened protection under the Due
Process Clause; 187 and that prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights
177 Id. at 91.
178 See Schwartz, After QualifiedImmunity, supra note 14, at 317-26 (responding to Fallon
and Jeffries's argument).
179 Id. at 322-23 (footnote omitted).
180 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
181 408 U.S. 593, 599-601 (1972).
182 See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty"and 'Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV.
405 (1977) (describing the implications of Fourteenth Amendment Supreme Court cases and
the new interpretations of "liberty" and "property" when defined separately under the
Constitution).
183 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 4, at 98-114 (discussing the term "property"); id. 11425 (discussing the interpretation of "liberty"); id. 125-34 (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment's procedural "due process" doctrine).
184 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("A finding of 'mental illness' alone
cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in
simple custodial confinement.").
185 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-33 (1982) (recognizing "liberty interests in
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints").
186 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
187 See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391-92 (2015) (stating that "a pretrial
detainee must show . . . only that the officers' use of that force was objectively unreasonable").
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apply not only to deliberate punishments but also to prison
conditions, medical care, 188 and protection from other prisoners. 189
Graham v. Connor held that police excessive force violates the
Fourth Amendment 90 ; Village of Willowbrook v. Olech recognized
the viability of a "class of one" Equal Protection claim 191; and
Connick v. Myers set up a framework for adjudicating public
employee speech claims. 192 This body of case law may not be as

rights-protective as Professor Schwartz (or I) would like, but it
founded modern constitutional tort litigation and authorized
recovery to a significant number of plaintiffs. Given the Court's
conservative bend over the past fifty years, these protections
doubtfully would be as strong as they are without qualified
immunity.

But Professor Schwartz cites impressive empirical research,
much of it her own, which shows that "most law enforcement
agencies do not collect [the relevant] information about lawsuits
brought against their officers";19 3 that "lawsuit payouts have no
financial consequences for the majority of large law enforcement
agencies across the country"; 194 and that "[a]vailable evidence of
indemnification and budgeting practices suggest that courts should
not be overly concerned about damages awards against individual
officers and agencies." 195 Professor Schwartz may be correct in her
assessment of the current impact of constitutional tort liability. But
it appears that someone is paying attention to the costs of

constitutional tort suits. Another recent empirical study provides
evidence that "insurance companies can and do shape police
188 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners" violates the Eighth Amendment).
189 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) ("[A] prison official may be held liable
under the Eighth Amendment . . . if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that, risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.").
190 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) ("Where ...
the excessive force claim arises in the context of
an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment. . .").
191 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
192 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) ("When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by
the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.").
193 Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 14, at 1821-22.
194 Id
at 1823.
195 Id. at 1828.
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behavior" by imposing training and oversight requirements as

conditions of coverage. 196
Even if Professor Schwartz is correct in her general assessment
of the current situation, her empirical evidence cannot tell us what
would happen if liability were extended by eliminating qualified
immunity, as she proposes, or by global municipal liability, as other
remedial maximalists recommend. The countervailing case for
caution is that, other things equal, costly changes in official
immunity or municipal liability doctrine may lead to a lower level
of constitutional protection, not only by imposition of damages
liability in many cases in which defendants currently prevail, but
also by encouraging others to bring claims that would clearly be
barred under the current immunity doctrine.
C. VINDICATION OF RIGHTS VS. FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS

Abolition of official immunity would involve imposing liability on
officers who commit constitutional violations, even though they
fully complied with the constitutional law in force at the time they
acted. Would the abolition of official immunity be fair to officers?
One answer might be that officers lack standing to raise a fairness
objection since they are typically indemnified. There are three
problems with this answer. First, it is contingent on the
jurisdiction's willingness to continue to indemnify. Second, it
ignores the officer's interest in avoiding the stigma of possible
unjust liability. 197 Third, it does not resolve the fairness issue but
merely reframes it. Now, the issue may be whether abolition would
be fair to governments who ultimately pay. That is the core fairness
issue and the focus of the ensuing discussion. But similar factors
are at play no matter how the fairness issue is framed.
In Owen v. City of Independence,198 the Court brushed aside
concerns about the fairness of denying immunity to governments.
Rather, the Court said, "Elemental notions of fairness dictate that
one who causes a loss should bear the loss."199 Since "the public at
large .

.

. enjoys the benefits of the government's activities .

.

. it is

196 Rappaport, supra note 88, at 1549.
197 See Wells, supra note 149, at 737-39 (arguing that defendants in constitutional torts
cases also have an interest in being vindicated).
198 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980).
199 Id. at 654.
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the public at large which is ultimately responsible for its
administration."0 0 Consequently, "[i]t hardly seems unjust to
require a municipal defendant which has violated a citizen's
constitutional rights to compensate him for the injury suffered
thereby." 20 1 One way of understanding-or perhaps building uponthis rhetoric is to see it as conforming with the idea that
municipalities are not merely abstract entities that collect and
dispense money. They are, in essence, collaborative social projects
undertaken by all those who fund them and enjoy the benefits they
provide. These human beings are thus "stakeholders" rather than
mere bystanders or strangers to the city's activities. Because they
elect city leaders, who in turn oversee other municipal employees,
these stakeholders bear some responsibility for the acts of both
elected and appointed officials.
Owen advanced this anti-immunity rationale for a limited
purpose. 20 2 The Court ruled only that local governments were liable
for constitutional torts caused by their "official policy" or
"custom." 20 3 Professor Schwartz and other remedial maximalists
would, in effect, take Owen's reasoning much further. They would
impose liability on a municipality, and thus on the municipality's
stakeholders, just because a street-level official has violated a
constitutional right. But this view reaches too far. Even if
vindication and deterrence are served by strict liability, it is not fair
to city stakeholders to make them pay for all violations, no matter
how newfangled, unforeseeable, or otherwise excusable the
violation turns out to be.
In the first place, contrary to the Court's pronouncement in
Owen, the proposition that "one who causes a loss should bear the
loss" is not an "[e]lemental notionH of fairness," 20 4 or at least not an
uncontested one in the common law of torts. Simple causation,
standing alone, does not typically suffice to establish liability.
Something more is always required, whether it be negligence, or an

zoo Id.

at 655.

Id. at 654.
202 Id. at 657 ("In sum, our decision holding that municipalities have no immunity from
201

damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations harmonizes well with
developments in the common law and our own pronouncements on official immunities under
§ 1983.").
203 Id.
204 Id. at 654.
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intentional invasion of the plaintiffs interests, or an abnormally
dangerous activity, or the introduction of a defective product into
the stream of commerce. 20 5

In the second place, the common law's reluctance to base liability
on nothing more than causing a loss is justified, in large part, by the
unfairness of imposing liability without fault. Obvious differences
exist between constitutional torts and common law torts, but the
nature of this unfairness is essentially the same in both contexts: in
carrying out the activities of daily life that make up the subject
matter of ordinary tort law, and in carrying out the activities of
government that make up the subject matter of constitutional torts,
actors face choices among alternative courses of action. Any choice
may produce an injury, of either the common law or the
constitutional variety. The basic task, in both common law and
constitutional torts, is to determine whether, in light of the injury
that occurred, the actor will be liable for the choice that the actor
made. If the actor cannot appreciate, on the basis of the facts then
reasonably available to him, that one course of action is riskier than
another, he does not make a choice to risk harm to others when he
acts. This is so even if, as events unfold, the act the officer has
chosen turns out to generate more risk of injury-whether that
injury is a common law wrong or a constitutional violation-than
the alternative would have produced. In either case, imposing
liability would be unfair because the actor has not chosen to
generate excessive risk. A defendant who crashes his car into the
plaintiffs building, for example, "causes loss" to another. But the
driver is not liable if he lost control of the car on account of an
unforeseeable epileptic seizure or suddenly turns the wheel to avoid
running over a child. 206
Turning to constitutional

torts, consider two scenarios. In

scenario (a), an officer (call him Oscar) faces a choice between two
courses of action, which we will call "alpha" and "beta." Oscar
chooses alpha. Stipulate that, at the time Oscar acted, it was clear
to a reasonable person that "alpha" was in fact a choice of highly

205 Desmond M. Clarke, Causation and Liability in Tort Law, 5 JURIS. 217, 217 (2014)
(explaining that "the mere fact that someone's behaviour affects another causally is not
enough to imply liability").
206 See Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (explaining that
the "liability of a driver, suddenly stricken by an illness rendering him unconscious, for injury
resulting from an accident occurring during that time rests on principles of negligence").

2021]

OBJECTIONS TO STRICT LIABILITY

1317

doubtful constitutionality and that "beta" was not. Oscar is at fault
and should even be denied official immunity because he could
reasonably foresee that alpha would expose other people to a serious
risk of constitutional violation, while beta would not. 20 7 If Oscar is a
policymaker-or if a policymaker is at fault in hiring Oscar, training
him, or supervising him-the local government should be liable as
well. 208

Now consider scenario (b), in which, at the time Oscar acted or
failed to head off his subordinate's act, he could not reasonably
foresee more constitutional danger from alpha than from beta
because the law at that time did not distinguish between the two.
In that event, Oscar did not choose to expose others to the risk of
greater constitutional danger because he had no reason to know
that this course of action would violate the Constitution, and he did
not choose to risk that consequence. In Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 209 for example, the County Prosecutor, a policymaker,
instructed police officers to enter a doctor's office without a warrant
to serve "capiases," ordering them to appear before a grand jury. 2 10
This entry violated the doctor's Fourth Amendment rights, but the
unconstitutionality of the entry became manifest only later when
the Court decided Steagald v. United States.211 The case law at the
time of the event evidently "permit[ted] law enforcement officials to
enter the premises of a third person to serve a capias." 212 If the
unconstitutional consequence was "concealed," as I have stipulated,
holding the prosecutor liable is unfair, and holding Cincinnati and
its stakeholder-residents liable for the challenged act is equally

207 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 95 (1989) (noting that both wrongdoing and
causation are needed before seeking corrective justice in an official immunity context).
208 See Wells, supra note 41, at 306 (noting that policymakers may be
liable for "the hiring,
training, and supervising of relatively low-level government workers . . . who deal with
potential constitutional tort victims on a daily basis").
209 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
210 Id. at 472 & n. 1.
211 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981) (finding that entry into the home of a third person without a
search warrant, absent exigent circumstances, violates the Fourth Amendment).
212 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 475.
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unfair. 213 As Justice Holmes put the point, "[a] choice which entails
a concealed consequence is as to that consequence no choice." 2 4
V. POCKETS OF STRICT LIABILITY

The costs identified in Part IV support a general rule that
negligence is the appropriate sorting mechanism for imposing

constitutional tort liability. But the principle underlying that rule
is that liability should depend on a comparison of costs and benefits.
The cost-benefit approach advocated in this Article rejects a "one
size fits all" approach. Instead, those costs must be balanced against
the benefits of strict liability in each particular constitutional tort
context. 215 In some cases, the benefits of strict liability may

outweigh the costs.
A. STRICT LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
POLICIES

The current municipal liability doctrine distinguishes between
two sets of cases: (a) those in which the unconstitutional act is
committed by a street-level officer (a majority of the reported cases),
and (b) those in which the unconstitutional act is committed by a
government or its policymakers. Strict liability is the rule for
category (b). 21 6 These are instances in which local governments

213 See also Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) ("No longer is individual
'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined
fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct."). In Owen, policymakers fired
the plaintiff without a hearing, which was allowed under Court doctrine at that time. Id. at
634. Two months later, the Court ruled that employees had a procedural due process right to
a hearing in such circumstances. Id. The Court ruled that the city was liable under the new
ruling. Id. at 657.
214 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). For

a roughly similar line of reasoning in the qualified immunity context, see generally Barbara
E. Armacost, QualifiedImmunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998).
215 A corollary of this line of reasoning is that, in a given context, the benefits of liability
may be especially low compared to the costs, so much so that absolute immunity may be the
appropriate rule. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 1110, 1138-48 (1981) (arguing that the high costs and low benefits of litigation
against legislators and judges may justify the absolute immunity these officers enjoy).
216 Category (a) cases typically require a showing of "deliberate indifference" on the part of
policymakers in order to impose strict liability. In my view, that rule is too favorable to the
government. Negligence should be sufficient for liability. See Wells, supra note 41, at 299-
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enforce unconstitutional policies, 217 as well as "single act" cases like
Pembaur, in which municipal policymakers commit constitutional
violations. 218 In these situations, policymakers enact an
unconstitutional rule of general application, 2 19 or enforce an
informal top-down custom to similar effect, or give a single nonrecurring order. Monell and Pembaur illustrate the point that in
each of these situations the government is strictly liable, even if the
policy or the single act of the policymaker seems to be valid under
the law at the time and is only later determined to be
unconstitutional. Application of the negligence principle would
shield governments from liability in some of these cases.
Nonetheless, good reasons may exist to retain the current strict
liability rule for these category (a) cases.
When the
government's policymakers
directly violate
constitutional rights, the benefits of strict liability may be
sufficiently high to justify an exception to the general negligence
rule for this narrow category of constitutional torts. First,
government responsibility for the violation in these cases is
manifest since the government's policymaker commits the
violation. 220 Second, vindication of rights is more fully realized by
removing the negligence requirement. Third, litigation that
challenges formal rules and top-down customs may implicate
especially strong vindication and deterrence concerns because most
rules and customs apply to many specific instances. They will
typically affect others besides the plaintiff. Thus, the benefits of the
plaintiffs victory will probably be shared by others. Fourth,
removing the negligence hurdle simplifies the litigation and avoids
the risk that a jury will in some cases find no negligence, and thus

300 (arguing that the deliberate indifference standard "puts too many hurdles in the path of
plaintiffs" and advocating that the Court replace this standard "with an objective test similar
to the reasonableness rule of common law negligence").
217 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 650 (rejecting "a construction of § 1983 that would accord
municipalities a qualified immunity for their good-faith constitutional violations").
218 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) ("[I]t is plain that municipal
liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate
circumstances.").
219 See Monellv. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978) (analyzing a policy requiring
female employees to take pregnancy leave at five months of pregnancy).
220 See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) ("Where a plaintiff
claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to
do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward.").
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sacrifice vindication and deterrence for no good reason. Fifth, the
strict liability rule is already in place and seems to work well in
practice. 221 Experience with it, in the narrow category to which it
applies, has given rise to no outcry for change and does not suggest

any compelling need for change. No current U.S. Supreme Court
Justice seems to have raised any objection to it.
Ultimately, it is fair to say that retaining the rule of strict
liability for category (b) cases carries with it some costs linked to
less fairness, less distributive justice, and the "rightsretrenchment" risk due to remedial equilibration. 222 On balance,
however, these costs may be worth bearing in this small set of
constitutional tort cases. This line of reasoning would also support
imposing strict liability on state governments as well, if not for the
Court's rulings that states are not among the "person[s]" who may
be sued under

§ 1983.223

B. EXCESSIVE FORCE LITIGATION

In most fact patterns, the current qualified immunity rule
distinguishes between (a) the substantive constitutional rule
violated by the officer and (b) the clarity of that constitutional rule
and of its application to the facts at hand. The basis for a defense,
either under current law or the negligence alternative I have
proposed, is that (a) and (b) raise distinct issues, such that they
should be kept separate. With respect to (b), the fairness and
deterrence goals of constitutional tort law are better served by
basing liability on negligence rather than strict liability.
In one context, however, the distinction between (a) and (b) is
illusory, at least as a practical matter. These are cases in which the
police use force in connection with an arrest. The constitutional rule
is that an officer's use of force is a seizure, which violates the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable ...

seizures" if the force

See cases cited supra notes 217-218.
See supra Part IV.
223 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989) ("We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
'persons' under § 1983."); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (stating that "§ 1983 does
not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity
of the States").
221

222
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is excessive. 224 The question of "whether the force used to effect a
particular seizure is 'reasonable' . . . requires a careful balancing of
'the nature and quality of the intrusion ... ' against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." 225 But qualified
immunity adds another layer of protection against liability. Under
current law, an officer may win even if his use of force is excessive
(and thus unreasonable) if he can show that he made a reasonable
mistake as to the reasonableness of his force. 226 Although the two
issues are analytically distinct, the "cumulation of messages ...

has

led many lower courts to reject civil liability for excessive force in
circumstances where such liability seems fully justified." 227
The cost-benefit approach to qualified immunity suggests that
the benefits of qualified immunity are comparatively weak in this
context. Fair notice to the officer is satisfied by the plaintiff's burden
to show a lack of reasonableness as to the need for and amount of
force in order to prevail on her Fourth Amendment issue. Qualified
immunity requires a further inquiry into whether the officer made
a reasonable mistake as to Fourth Amendment reasonableness. But
that extra layer of protection is not necessary to ensure that he is
treated fairly. From the standpoint of incentives, the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness hurdle only assures that the liability
rule will deter the use of force when there is no plausible rationale
for the use of force or its amount given the circumstances. Thus,
"qualified immunity would impart only a very slight addition to the
protections built into the constitutional standard for excessive
force."228

Conversely, the benefits of strict liability may be especially high
in the excessive force context. Recall that strict liability is
sometimes justified in common law torts on the theory that some
activities are "abnormally dangerous," even if necessary. 229 In such
contexts, strict liability is imposed in order to diminish the "activity
224 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386. 394 (1989) (observing that excessive use of force claims
are "most properly characterized as ... invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees citizens the right 'to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures' of the person." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
225 Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
226 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (stating that even if an officer applied
unreasonable force, qualified immunity still applies if "the mistaken belief was reasonable").
227 Jeffries, supra note 35, at 267-68.
228
229

Id. at 267.
See supra note 142-143 and accompanying text.
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level" of these activities, such as blasting or the transportation of
hazardous substances. 230 In general, this "activity level" rationale
for strict liability seems inapplicable to the governmental activities
that give rise to most constitutional tort suits. But it may be
appropriate to apply this reasoning to the narrow context of police

use of force. A string of recent incidents involving excessive force
has given rise to calls for reform of police practices. 23 1 In this
context, strict liability may serve a purpose similar to that of the
common law rule on abnormally dangerous activities. If
governments respond to strict liability by reducing the targeted
activity, then strict liability would lead to fewer uses of force by the
police. The result would be to cut back on violations of constitutional
rights without sacrificing fairness to officers and governments or
overly deterring effective police work.
VI. COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF ABOLISHING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

The qualified immunity doctrine increases the complexity-and
thus the cost-of litigation. The problem is not just that courts must
address an issue besides the substantive merits. Two U.S. Supreme
Court doctrines increase the cost even further by adding to the
complexity of constitutional tort litigation. Professor Schwartz
argues,

rightly,

that

eliminating

qualified

immunity

would

eliminate these added complications and thus lower the cost of
constitutional tort litigation.

First, in any constitutional tort case, the plaintiff must win both
on the merits and on immunity. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court
said that trial judges have discretion to decide the immunity issue
before the merits. 2 32 When a judge upholds immunity, it becomes
unnecessary to reach the merits at all.2 33 That decision may then be
See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jon Kamp & Valerie Bauerlein, Viral Videos from ProtestsFuel BroaderDebate
Over Policing, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2020, 11:58 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/viralvideos-from-protests-fuel-broader-debate-over-policing-11591398962 (discussing incidents of
police excessive force during demonstrations and protests sparked by the killing of George
Floyd during an arrest); see supra note 4.
232 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
233 See id. at 237 (stating that, by deciding the immunity issue first, district courts can
avoid "[u]nnecessary litigation of constitutional issues" that "wastes the parties' resources"
and that exacerbates "heavy caseloads").
230
231
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reversed on appeal, thus requiring another trip to the district court,
or the appellate court may uphold the immunity claim, perhaps
leaving the state of the law uncertain.
The second cost generator is Mitchell v. Forsyth, which allowed
interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immunity. 234 Thus, a
defendant may assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss the
complaint and in a motion for summary judgment. 235 If she loses,
she may be entitled to immediately appeal that ruling, delaying
further proceedings on the merits. 2 36 In theory, she may raise

immunity in a motion to dismiss, appeal the judge's denial, lose the
appeal, raise immunity again in a motion for summary judgment,

and again appeal the judge's denial. 237 An additional complication
is that some, but not all, denials of qualified immunity are
immediately appealable. 238 The Court has distinguished between
denials of immunity based on questions of law and those based on
findings of evidence sufficiency. 239 When a denial of qualified
immunity is based on the judge's determination that the plaintiffs
evidence is sufficient to permit success at trial, an interlocutory
appeal is not available. 240 Issues can then arise as to whether a
given denial of immunity falls on one side or the other of this line. 241

234 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
235 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1996) (explaining that,
under Mitchell,
a defendant can assert qualified immunity at "successive stages").
236 See id. at 307 ("Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of
qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a 'final'
judgment subject to immediate appeal.").
237

Id.

See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (holding that denials of qualified
immunity based on issues of fact are not immediately appealable).
239 See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313 (explaining that denials of immunity based on issues of
law are final decisions, whereas denials based on findings of evidentiary sufficiency are not).
240 Johnson, 515 U.S. 307.
241 See, e.g., Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 878-79 (10th Cir. 2014)
(noting that "the district court ultimately denied summary judgment because issues of fact
remained" but still finding that the court had "jurisdiction to consider [the defendant's] legal
challenges" to several determinations); George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834-36 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding that the challenges to the trial court's denial of qualified immunity largely concerned
the sufficiency of evidence provided by respondent, yet still reviewing the trial court's order
to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law);
Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that several of the
challenges to the trial court's denial of qualified immunity were purely concerned with issues
of fact rather than law, thus the court lacked jurisdiction to review them).
238
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Professor Schwartz points out that these doctrines generate
significant costs because of (1) the need to adjudicate the immunity
issue, (2) the uncertainty as to substantive rights that Pearsoncan
produce, and (3) the tendency of both doctrines to require trips up
to the circuit court and back down again. Her research amply
supports that "qualified immunity actually increases the time, cost,
and complexity of civil rights cases in which the defense is raised." 242
Some of those costs relate to the litigation of the immunity issue 24 3
and cannot be avoided without abolition. But others are directly
linked to the Mitchell doctrine. For example, "cases can be
suspended while qualified immunity motions and appeals are
pending." 244 Her research found "formal discovery stays-lasting
152 days, on average-in almost 6% of the cases in the docket
dataset in which qualified immunity was raised at the motion to
dismiss stage." 245 In addition, "interlocutory appeals were pending

for 441 days on average before being decided." 246 Pearson's impact,
though harder to quantify, has led to "confusion about the scope of
constitutional rights" since "[a]pproximately one-quarter of circuit

court decisions grant defendants qualified immunity without first
ruling on the constitutionality of defendants' behavior." 247 The
uncertainty means that qualified immunity will be available in the
next case and the one after that, until a court eventually resolves
the constitutional issue. By hypothesis, some of the claims that were
denied will turn out to be meritorious, and the vindication and
deterrence goals will have been thwarted by Pearson.
Mitchell and Pearson generate significant costs. Professor
Schwartz and others document the magnitude of those costs. But
her solution-the abolition of qualified immunity-is not
proportionate to the problem. Those costs can be largely, if not
wholly, eliminated without jettisoning qualified immunity. All that
is necessary is to overrule Mitchell and Pearson. To put the point
more precisely: suppose that, absent this set of costs, the case for

Schwartz, After QualifiedImmunity, supra note 14, at 338.
See id. at 338 ("[T]hey spend time and money researching, briefing, writing, arguing,
and deciding motions raising qualified immunity.").
244 Id. at 340.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 318 & n.33 (citing Professor Schwartz relies on Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher
J. Walker, The New QualifiedImmunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2015)).
242
243
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abolition falls short because an assessment of the pluses and
minuses of keeping a modified version of the doctrine comes out in
favor of retention, as I have suggested in Parts II and III. In that

event, the costs associated with Pearson and Mitchell would not
suffice to tip the scales because those costs can be eliminated by
overruling Pearson and Mitchell without giving up the benefits of
maintaining a qualified immunity doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION

U.S. Supreme Court cases on qualified immunity have pushed
the doctrine too far in favor of defendants. Qualified immunity
protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law," 248 and even defendants meeting those criteria may
escape liability "unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite
that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have
understood that he was violating it."24 9 By documenting the failings
of this doctrine, Professor Schwartz's empirical studies have made
a strong case for reform. The municipal liability doctrine, which
currently requires proof of policymakers' "deliberate indifference" to
subordinates' constitutional violations, is also overly protective of
government defendants in many of its applications. But the solution
is not to eliminate qualified immunity or to impose vicarious
liability. The costs of strict liability would be considerable, and
many of the benefits could be obtained at lower cost by adopting the
negligence principle as the liability rule in both contexts.

248 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
249 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014)).
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